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Assessing the effectiveness of non-state based grievance mechanisms in 
providing access to remedy for rightsholders: A case study of the Roundtable 
on Sustainable Palm Oil 
Mark Wielga and James Harrison 
Abstract 
This article explores different approaches to assessing the effectiveness of non-state based non-
judicial grievance mechanisms (NSBGMs) in achieving access to remedy for rightsholders. It 
queries the approach which has been widely adopted as a result of the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). This focuses on the procedural aspects of 
grievance mechanisms. Rather, it stresses the importance of analysing the outcomes of cases for 
rightsholders. It tests out this hypothesis by undertaking comprehensive empirical research into 
the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil’s complaint mechanism. RSPO is found to perform well 
when judged according to the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria. But it performs poorly when 
individual cases are assessed to ascertain the outcomes that are achieved for rightsholders. The 
article therefore argues for the importance of equivalent scrutiny of outcomes in relation to other 





International human rights law has often struggled to provide effective remedies to victims of 
human rights violations.1 The issue of effective remedies has been identified as a particular 
problem within the human rights and business field. John Ruggie, in his role as UN Special 
Representative on human rights and transnational corporations, identified a “patchwork of 
mechanisms” that was “incomplete and flawed.”2  In recognition of this problem, Ruggie 
                                                          
1 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (OUP, 2006).  





developed the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) 
which, inter alia, require that companies establish or participate in mechanisms that provide 
access to remedy for rightsholders whose human rights have been infringed as a result of 
corporate actions.3 This is a part of what has become known as “Access to Remedy” or the 
“Third Pillar” of the UNGPs.  
According to the UNGPs, remedy can be provided by various fora. Judicial remedies are “at 
the core” of ensuring access to remedy.4 But other mechanisms are also identified as important. 
Government-sponsored non-judicial mechanisms such as labour inspectorates, employment 
tribunals and national human rights institutions are identified as playing an ‘essential role’ in 
complementing and supplementing judicial mechanisms.  The UNGPs also recognize a third 
category of mechanisms, private remedies in which the government has no direct role, so-called 
non-state based non-judicial grievance mechanisms (NSBGMs). These can include companies’ 
operational level grievance mechanisms, development bank complaint mechanisms, and multi-
stakeholder initiative complaint mechanisms. An example from this last category of grievance 
mechanisms is the focus of this article.  
There is significant debate about the potential of NSBGMs to provide access to effective 
remedy.5 But empirical inquiry as to when and how NSBGMs might contribute to providing 
access to remedy for rightsholders remains under-explored.6 This article contributes to that 
debate by focusing on a critical methodological question:  how should we assess whether 
NSBGMs are providing access to remedy for rightsholders? While there is increasing recognition 
                                                          
3 Human Rights Council, United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011), Principles 29, 30 and 
31.  
4 Ibid, Principle 26.  
5 See a synopsis of this debate in Haines, Fiona, and Kate Macdonald. ‘Nonjudicial business regulation and 
community access to remedy’ (2020) 14 Regulation & Governance, 840.     
6 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Accountability and Remedy Project Part III: 
Non-State-based grievance mechanisms: Enhancing effectiveness of non-State-based grievance mechanisms in cases 
of business-related human rights abuse’ (19 November 2019), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/ARP/ARPIII_Discussion_Paper_Nov2019.pdf (accessed 18 




that access to an effective remedy means that complaints mechanisms should be effective in 
terms of both process and outcome, the focus of much of the existing scrutiny of complaints 
mechanisms is on the procedural aspects, and in particular, the effectiveness criteria for 
grievance mechanisms set out in the UNGPs. This article argues that these are not sufficient to 
ensure a proper assessment of whether an effective remedy is available for rightsholders. More 
focus is warranted on determining whether the outcomes of NSBGMs are effective in order to 
make a determination of effectiveness. In order to test this hypothesis, a case study which 
investigates the complaints mechanism of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) is 
undertaken. The RSPO complaint mechanism fulfills more of the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria 
than most other NSBGMs, but we find that there are fundamental problems in terms of the 
outcomes which it produces for rightsholders.   
While our study focuses on one relatively narrow aspect of the business and human rights 
debate, it is an important contribution to broader issues within the field. It has been recognized 
by this journal that scholarship on business and human rights has so far ‘engaged relatively 
scarcely in empirical analysis’ and that as a result, various hypotheses about business and human 
rights performance have not been properly tested.7 This article presents the findings of just such 
an empirical investigation. As a result of our findings, we make suggestions about the ways in 
which NSBGMs should be assessed in the future to ensure that their role in providing access to 
effective remedies for rights holders is properly evaluated. This matters to broader debates about 
access to remedy. By scrutinizing more carefully and precisely how each individual mechanism 
contributes (or does not contribute) to the overall goal of achieving effective remedy, we build 
up a more accurate picture of the current situation and we are better placed to advocate for 
reforms that will improve remedies in the future. 
The remainder of the article is set out as follows. We first explore different approaches to 
assessing the effectiveness of NSBGMs in providing a remedy, querying the focus on procedural 
aspects, and stressing the importance of analysing the outcomes of cases for rightsholders 
(section II). This is followed by an explanation of how the RSPO and its complaint mechanism 
functions and an assessment of how well it meets the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria (section III). 
                                                          
7 Surya Deva et al. ‘Business and Human Rights Scholarship: Past Trends and Future Directions’ (2019) 4:2 




In section IV we introduce an alternative approach and methodology for assessing the 
effectiveness of the RSPO complaints mechanism, focusing on the outcomes produced for 
claimants and then present the results when that methodology is used (section V). In section VI, 
we reflect on those results, in light of the wider literature on NSBGMs and access to remedy, and 
consider the implications for how NSGBMs are assessed in terms of their ability to provide an 
effective remedy in the future. Section VII concludes the article.          
        
II. ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NSBGMS IN PROVIDING A REMEDY 
 
Rights and remedies are fundamentally interdependent. International human rights law 
recognizes that the right to an effective remedy is integral to ensuring that substantive rights are 
adequately protected.8  In the field of business and human rights, this has also been widely 
recognised, and is central to the way in which the UNGPs have been constructed. Under the 
UNGPs, the state must provide effective judicial and non-judicial remedy mechanisms to address 
business related human rights abuses.9 In terms of judicial remedies, a transnational corporation 
may be subject to courts enforcing legal human rights norms both in the country where they are 
headquartered and the host countries where they operate.10 In terms of non-judicial remedies, 
states should create their own accountability mechanisms as well as cooperating through 
institutions such as the OECD National Contact Point system. The role of NSBGMs in 
complementing these other mechanisms is discussed below. Significant work has been 
undertaken to map out the extent of this patchwork of remedies.11 There is also an emerging 
                                                          
8 Diane Shelton, note 1, as demonstrated in Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 8); International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (art. 2).  
9 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Principles 26, 27. 
10 Yousuf Aftab, Audrey Mocle, Business and Human Rights as Law: Towards Justiciability of Rights, Involvement, 
and Remedy, LexisNexis Canada Inc. 2019. Chapter 2-Legal Risk. Surya Deva, David Bilchitz, Human Rights 
Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect?, Cambridge. 2013. [Chapter 14] 
11 E.g. SOMO, ‘The Patchwork of Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanisms: Addressing the Limitations of the Current 





debate over the effectiveness of these mechanisms to provide remedies to rightsholders.12 Recent 
work which has sought to survey the current situation in relation to judicial remedies in domestic 
jurisdictions has found it to be “patchy, unpredictable, often ineffective and fragile,” 13 while 
government-sponsored non-judicial mechanisms in many situations do not offer “an accessible 
or realistic route to an effective remedy.”14 Concern over the current inadequacies is perhaps best 
demonstrated by the significant political and academic support for a binding human rights treaty. 
A key attraction of such a treaty is its capacity to provide more effective remedies to 
rightsholders.15    
Our contribution focuses on one particular aspect of the remedies ecosystem, NSBGMs. 
More than in relation to other forms of remedy, there is a debate about the inherent capacity of 
these mechanisms to play any kind of legitimate or meaningful role in addressing human rights-
                                                          
Judicial%20Grievance%20Mechanisms%20Addressing%20the,their%20limitations%2C%20and%20provide%20rec
ommendations%20for%20improving%20them.   
12 E.g. Surya Deva, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Abuses: Humanizing Business (Abingdon: Routledge 
2012) pointing out the inadequacies of existing regimes and proposing an integrated theory of regulation to 
overcome those inadequacies.; Lukas et al, note 12, which analyzes both non-judicial governmental systems and 
non-governmental systems and judging them against the UNGPs’ Effectiveness Criteria;  May Miller-Dawkins, 
Kate Macdonald and Shelley D. Marshall, ‘Beyond Effectiveness Criteria: The Possibilities and Limits of 
Transnational Non-Judicial Redress Mechanisms’ (November 6, 2016) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2865356  (accessed 
on 1 April 2020).  
13 Jennifer Zerk, ‘Corporate liability for gross human rights abuses Towards a fairer and more effective system of 
domestic law remedies A report prepared for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (no date) 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/StudyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf 
(accessed 17 March 2020) on the effects non-judicial mechanisms produce, under what conditions, and how they 
contribute to broader systems of remedy. 
14  United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Accountability and Remedy Project Part II: 
State-based non-judicial mechanisms State-based non-judicial mechanisms for accountability and remedy for 
business-related human rights abuses: Supporting actors or lead players? Discussion paper prepared for the 6th UN 
Annual Forum on Business and Human Rights’ (27-29 November 2017) 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/ARPII_%20DiscussionpaperonPhase2fo
rUNForum_FINAL.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2020). 
15 Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (Eds.), Building a Treaty on Business and Human Rights: Context and Contours 




related disputes between companies and rightsholders; While sceptics argue such mechanisms 
are unsuited to addressing the conflicts that arise between companies and communities, other 
commentators, as well as key UN actors have been keen to stress that NSBGMs do have an 
important role to play. 16  John Ruggie argued that while judicial remedies were central to 
ensuring access to remedy globally, both government-sponsored non-judicial mechanisms and 
NSBGMs were vital to supplement them. More recently, the United Nations Working Group on 
Business and Human Rights has made clear that NSBGMs are still considered an important 
component of the “bouquet of remedies” which should be available to rightsholders.17  
While key UN actors have therefore defended the role that NSBGMs can play in achieving 
access to remedy, their precise role within the overall architecture of the remedy eco-system is 
more ambiguous. One interpretation provided by Ruggie is to compliment state-based judicial 
and non-judicial mechanisms, providing a more immediate point of initial recourse, possible 
early resolution of issues in at least some instances, and an early warning system for 
management which allows for pre-emptive action on issues that might otherwise escalate.18 He 
also saw them as potentially playing a replacement role. Where national courts and government-
sponsored non-judicial mechanisms lack capacity to themselves provide an effective remedy, 
NSGBMs might play a more central role in providing redress.19 When making judgments about 
the effectiveness of NSGBMs, it is therefore important to consider what they are effective at 
doing: Can they act as effective compliment to, or replacement for, other forms of remedy?      
                                                          
16 For an overview, see Haines and MacDonald, note 5, 2 citing a range of authors arguing for and against the 
capacity of NSBGMs to play such a role.  
17 United Nations, ‘Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises’ A/72/162, (18 July 2017). 
18 John G. Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights. (New York: W.W. Norton 
Company, 2013), 102-104, 116.  
19 Ibid. Making this point about dual roles, and the potential for NSBGMs, according to Ruggie, to play a central 
role, see Stefan Zagelmeyer, Lara Bianchi, Andrea R. Shemberg ‘Non-state based non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms (NSBGM): An exploratory analysis: A report prepared for the Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights’ (13 July 2018) https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/ARP/ManchesterStudy.pdf 




Moving on to consider different approaches to evaluating the effectiveness of NSBGMs, the 
UNGPs recognise that there are both procedural and substantive aspects to access to remedy, and 
the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights (subsequently ‘the UN Working Group’) 
has reaffirmed that remediation should be effective in terms of both process and outcome.20  But 
there has been much more focus on unpacking what the procedural aspects of effective remedy 
entail.21 This commenced with Principle 31 of the UNGPs which sought to “provide a 
benchmark for designing, revising or assessing a non-judicial grievance mechanism to help 
ensure that it is effective in practice.”22 According to these criteria, non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms should be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, transparent, rights-
compatible and a source of continuous learning. These effectiveness criteria focus on the 
procedural aspects of grievance mechanisms, or the “characteristics” that any grievance 
mechanism should have if it is to be successful.23 They aspire to create requirements for how 
grievance mechanisms should operate so that there are not insurmountable barriers to 
rightsholders who wish to make complaints (e.g. as a result of excessive costs, lack of 
information as to how they operate, etc.) and they are procedurally fair to rightsholders who 
decide to use them (e.g. by being clear on timeframes and potential outcomes that might be 
achieved, ensuring access to information and expertise necessary to pursue a case etc.). These 
procedural criteria have become the focus for evaluating whether NSBGMs are providing 
effective remedies. They are discussed by industry associations, companies and multi-
stakeholder initiatives (including RSPO) as standards against which to instigate, review and 
reform the operation of their complaints mechanisms.24 They are utilised in academic studies 
                                                          
20 Human Rights Council (2011), note 3, 22. 
21 We discuss how both the UNGPs and UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights have defined the 
substantive aspects of effective remedy in section IV below. Our point here is that these substantive aspects remain 
marginalised within overall discussions of how effective remedy is achieved in practice.   
22 Human Rights Council, note 3, 27.  
23 Lukas et al., note 12. 
24 We make no claims here about the extent to which the effectiveness criteria processes have actually influenced 
NSBGMs in practice, as the evidence for this is rather sparse. But examples of them being discussed include 




which investigate how NSBGMs are operating.25 They are also translated into benchmarking 
processes which compare NSBGMs’ performance. For instance, the Corporate Human Rights 
Benchmark compares the performance of companies’ operational level grievance mechanisms 
using indicators which draw upon the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria.26 As such, the UNGPs’ 
effectiveness criteria have become critical to the way in which NSBGMs are evaluated as well as 
being central to claims that efforts have been taken to strengthen complaints mechanisms by a 
number of authorities responsible for running them.  
While they have become central to the evaluation of NSBGM’s complaints mechanisms, the 
UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria leave  the issue of outcomes  largely unaddressed. The only 
criterion which touches upon the issue of outcomes states that grievance mechanisms should 
‘ensure that outcomes and remedies accord with internationally recognized human rights.’27 This 
criterion has been found to be ambiguous and to be difficult to translate into metrics whereby the 
effectiveness of outcomes can actually be measured.28 In light of this, commentators have raised 
concerns that focusing on the process of how an NSBGM operates may marginalise the more 
fundamental question of what outcomes are actually achieved for rightsholders and that an 
                                                          
https://www.ipieca.org/resources/good-practice/community-grievance-mechanisms-in-the-oil-and-gas-industry/ 
(accessed 20 November 2020);  
 Caroline Rees, ‘Piloting Principles for Effective Company-Stakeholder Grievance Mechanisms: A Report of 
Lessons Learned. CSR Initiative’, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge (2011), 
https://www.cdacollaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Piloting-Principles-for-Effective-Company-
Stakeholder-Grievance-Mechanisms-A-Report-of-Lessons-Learned.pdf (accessed 20 November 2020); CSR 
Europe, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Company Grievance Mechanisms’ (2013)  
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5df776f6866c14507f2df68a/t/5e666810b7c6ef5fcd9bf296/1583769622168/M
OC-A+Report.pdf (accessed 20 November 2020).   
25 Lukas et al, note 12.  
26 Corporate Human Rights Benchmark, ‘Methodology 2019 For the Agricultural Products, Apparel and Extractives 
Industries’ (2019)  https://www.corporatebenchmark.org/sites/default/files/2019-
11/CHRB%202019%20Methodology%20AGAPEX%2016Jan19.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2020).  
27 Human Rights Council,, note 3, Principle 31f. 
28 Benjamin Thompson, ‘Determining criteria to evaluate outcomes of businesses’ provision of remedy: Applying a 




NSBGM which meets the standards of procedural fairness demanded by the UNGPs might still 
fail to provide an effective remedy for claimants.29  
One study has already been undertaken on the outcomes achieved for stakeholders from 
NSBGMs.30  It examined the mechanisms used in ten case studies of corporate-community 
human rights disputes in India and Indonesia. The authors compared and contrasted individual 
cases from across various mechanisms to identify how outcomes for rightsholders differ 
depending on a variety of factors. Key factors include how the institutions responsible for 
enacting the complaint mechanisms are designed; their authority and capacity to investigate 
claims and implement judgments; and their ability to address power imbalances and empower 
communities so that they can influence how complaints processes are framed and the remedies 
that they ultimately receive.31 This study therefore makes an important contribution in 
identifying a range of factors that can influence the ability of various types of mechanisms to 
produce effective remedies for rightsholders.  A partner institution involved in the study, the 
Corporate Accountability Coalition, has also prepared in-depth analysis of a number of 
complaint mechanisms.32 
Our own study takes a different approach. We conduct a comprehensive investigation into 
the effectiveness of a single NSBGM, the complaint mechanism of the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil. RSPO is a multi-stakeholder initiative which brings together seven types 
                                                          
29 Martijn Scheltema, 'Assessing the Effectiveness of Remedy Outcomes of Non-judicial Grievance Mechanisms', 
(2013) The Dovenschmidt Quarterly, 190;  Miller-Dawkins, Macdonald and Marshall, note 12. 
30 Corporate Accountability Research, ‘Non-Judicial Redress Mechanisms Project Publications’,  (no date) 
https://corporateaccountabilityresearch.net/njm-project-publications (accessed on 1 April 2020). The Non Judicial 
Redress Mechanisms Project  is a multi-institutional effort with several authors and many researchers. It is a 
collaboration among Monash University, The University of Melbourne, Essex University, The University of 
Newcastle, CORE (Corporate Accountability Coalition), Homeworkers Worldwide and Action Aid Australia. 
31 Haines and Macdonald, note 5; Miller-Dawkins, Macdonald and Marshall, note 12.  
32 These are available at the Corporate Accountability Research website at 
https://corporateaccountabilityresearch.net/njm-project-publications (1 April 2020). The repository includes a study 
of the RSPO mechanism: Kate MacDonald and Samanthan Balaton-Chrimes, ‘The Complaints System of the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)’ Non-Judicial Reddress Mechanisms Report Series (2016) 




of stakeholders in the palm oil industry “to develop and implement global standards for 
sustainable palm oil.”33 We chose the RSPO complaint mechanism as the subject of our study 
because, as is documented below in section III, it performs particularly well when compared to 
other NSBGMs in terms of the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria. By undertaking a comprehensive 
assessment of a single NSBGM with relatively high levels of procedural fairness as defined by 
the UNGPs, we are able to demonstrate how it is still possible for that NSBGM to produce poor 
outcomes for rightsholders. This then allows us to raise broader questions about how we should 
assess the effectiveness of NSBGMs more generally. First, we explain why the RSPO complaints 
mechanism is a worthy choice for our study. 
III. THE RSPO AND ITS COMPLAINT MECHANISM 
Palm oil is an increasingly important and controversial part of the world agricultural system. 
In recent decades it has become the most sold plant-based oil and is used in everything from 
snack foods, to cosmetics, to industrial lubricants to biofuels. It has been estimated that fully fifty 
percent of products in a typical North American or UK grocery store contain palm oil.34  Palm oil 
grows in the tropics primarily within ten degrees of the equator. When well-managed, it is 
extremely productive per hectare planted, producing six to ten times the quantity of other oil 
crops.35 It has grown to cover well over twenty million hectares, much of the expansion 
occurring in tropical forests. Indonesia and Malaysia produce about two thirds of world supply. 
There are twelve million hectares planted in Indonesia alone, up from less than one half million 
hectares thirty years ago.36 There are also significant productive regions in West Africa and 
South America.  
                                                          
33 RSPO website, ‘About’ (no date) https://rspo.org/about (accessed on 20 April 2020). 
34 RSPO website, ‘#goodbadpalmoil’ (no date) https://rspo.org/about/goodbadpalmoil (accessed 2 April 2020).   
35 Dennis J Murphy, ‘Palm oil: scourge of the earth, or wonder crop?’ The Conversation, (30 June 2015), 
https://theconversation.com/palm-oil-scourge-of-the-earth-or-wonder-crop-42165 (accessed on 10 March 2020). 
36 Rob Cramb and John F. McCarthy (eds.) The Oil Palm Complex, Smallholders, Agribusiness and the State in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. (Singapore: NUS Press 2016), 31. Other estimates for Indonesia are as high as 21 million 
hectares; Bhimanto Suwastoyo, ‘Sawit Watch: Indonesia Has More than 21 Million Hectares of Oil Palm 




RSPO was founded in 2004 and sought to address the severe criticism palm oil received. This 
criticism has progressively increased. There are substantiated claims that palm oil production has 
decimated rainforests, destroyed wildlife habitat, displaced communities, caused widespread air 
and water pollution, resulted in violations of multiple labor rights, dismantled indigenous groups, 
unleashed massive carbon emissions including on peat lands, led to localized extinctions of 
orangutans, and many others.37 There continue to be widespread efforts to ban palm oil in 
products and retail outlets.38 It is among the most vilified agricultural products in the world.39  
The RSPO Standards have evolved to include, at their core, the protection of what it calls 
“High Conservation Value” forests (such as tropical rain forests), endangered species habitat, the 
rights of communities and indigenous peoples to consent to the use of land for plantations, and 
labor rights.40 Among the organizations’ founders are large, mostly Malaysian, companies, 
several of which are parts of enormous corporate conglomerates. They remain central to the 
organization. However, it is a multi-stakeholder initiative with a stated vision of being a 
“roundtable” for diverse interests. RSPO’s membership includes representatives from “oil palm 
                                                          
 https://thepalmscribe.id/sawit-watch-indonesia-has-more-than-21-million-hectares-of-oil-palm-plantations/ 
(accessed on 2 April 2020).  
37 Ibid.  
38 E.g. France in relation to biofuels (Reuters Staff, ‘In blow to Total, France upholds law banning palm oil from 
biofuel scheme’ Reuters (11 October 2019) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-total-biofuels-palmoil/in-blow-to-
total-france-upholds-law-banning-palm-oil-from-biofuel-scheme-idUSKBN1WQ0ZG (accessed 3 August 2020)); 
Norway in relation to public procurement of palm oil as a biofuel (Morgan Erickson-Davis, ‘Norway bans 
government purchasing of palm oil’ Mogabay News (13 June 2017) biofuel 
https://news.mongabay.com/2017/06/norway-bans-government-from-purchasing-palm-oil-biofuel/ (accessed 3 
August 2020)); European Commission in making palm oil ineligible to count toward EU renewable transport targets 
which will result in a phase-out of the palm oil based biofuel (EU Labels Biofuel From Palm Oil As Unsustainable, 
Bans Subsidies  
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davekeating/2019/03/14/eu-labels-biofuel-from-palm-oil-as-unsustainable-bans-
subsidies/#42469e459c9d (accessed 3 August 2020)). 
39 T.A. Jackson et al ‘Learning to Love the Worlds Most Hated Crop’ (2019) 31:3 Journal of Palm Oil 
Research,331. 
40 RSPO website, ‘Principles and Criteria for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil 2018’ (5 March 2020) 




growers, palm oil processors or traders, consumer goods manufacturers, retailers, banks and 
investors, environmental or nature conservation NGOs and social or developmental NGOs.”41 It 
has over four thousand members and claims that 19% of the world’s palm oil is RSPO 
certified.42  RSPO’s success in achieving its stated goals has been the subject of significant 
academic analysis, with the most cited studies questioning its effects on deforestation and habitat 
degradation, as well as raising issues about its legitimacy among those who have resisted 
expansion of oil palm cultivation.43  
The RSPO complaint mechanism was established in 2009 and has been refined over the 
years. It has formal rules, a professional secretariat panel, an appeal process and a stable of 
outside investigators.44 The process begins with a complaint and a written response from the 
respondent company. There is an initial determination that the complaint is appropriate for 
decision through the RSPO process. A complaints panel is constituted of representatives from 
RSPO’s multi-stakeholder members who declare themselves to have no professional, financial or 
personal relationship to the parties to the case. The complaints panel manages the dispute. Often, 
a third-party investigator is appointed by the complaints panel to go in person to judge the 
situation on the ground. The investigator then submits a report to the complaints panel. The 
complaints panel issues an initial interim order determining whether the RSPO standards have 
been violated and, when necessary, ordering actions to be taken by the member company to 
                                                          
41 RSPO website, ‘Membership’ (no date) https://www.rspo.org/files/resource_centre/Factsheet-RSPO-
Membership.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2020).   
42 RSPO website, note 33.  
43 On the environmental issues see Roberto Cazzolla Gatti et al. ‘Sustainable palm oil may not be so sustainable.’ 
(2019) 652 Science of The Total Environment 48; Kimberly M. Carlson et al. ‘Effect of oil palm sustainability 
certification on deforestation and fire in Indonesia’ (2018) 115:1 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
121; Denis Ruysschaert, and Denis Salles ‘Towards global voluntary standards: Questioning the effectiveness in 
attaining conservation goals: The case of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)’ (2014) 107 Ecological 
Economics, 438. On resistance by local actors, see Victoria Marin-Burgos, Joy S. Clancy, and Jon C. Lovett 
‘Contesting legitimacy of voluntary sustainability certification schemes: Valuation languages and power 
asymmetries in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil in Colombia’ (2015) 117 Ecological Economics, 303. 
44 RSPO, Complaints and Appeals Procedures, (Endorsed by the Board of Governors on 14 June 2017) 




return to compliance. These actions are then monitored, sometimes for years. The monitoring 
ends with the actions bringing the member company back into compliance and the claim is 
officially closed. A party who disagrees with the decision of the complaints panel can pursue an 
appeal procedure with an appeal panel.45 
The RSPO can also go from adjudication mode to settlement facilitation mode. This can 
happen anytime from immediately upon receiving the claim up until late in the monitoring stage 
after an order. Sometimes both tracks proceed simultaneously, with the RSPO encouraging 
dialogue and settlement while continuing to examine the case. Remedies ordered by the 
complaints panel are injunctive, that is, they are requests that the member company act or refrain 
from acting. There are no monetary awards or any forms of restitution. The ultimate sanction is 
to decertify a member company or operation. However, the complaints panel has power only 
over RSPO members and so a company can avoid its jurisdiction at any time by withdrawing 
from membership.  
In 2013, a Resolution of the RSPO General Assembly  required alignment of the complaints 
mechanism with the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria.46 Not only is the RSPO complaint 
mechanism formally aligned in this way, but it also performs far better than the vast majority of 
NSBGMs when assessed against those criteria. The Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Database (MSI 
Database) catalogues 45 different MSIs across industries from mining to telecommunications, 
clothing to fisheries.47 Its analysis of MSIs’ complaints mechanisms recognizes that the vast 
majority of MSIs do not meet the standards set by the effectiveness criteria.48 However, 
                                                          
45 This is based on analysis of what actually happened in the human rights claims reviewed. The RSPO Complaints 
and Appeals Procedures were updated in 2018. RSPO website, ‘Complaints and Appeals Procedures’ (17 September 
2019) https://rspo.org/resources/complaints (accessed on 2 April 2020).  
46 Holly Jonas, ‘A Review of the Complaints System of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil: Final Report’ (Sabah, Malaysia: Natural Justice, 2014)  
47 MSI Integrity and the Duke Human Rights Center at the Kenan Institute for Ethics ‘The Multi-Stakeholder 
Initiative Database’ (no date) https://msi-database.org/ (accessed on 2 April 2020). 
48 MSI Integrity and the Duke Human Rights Center at the Kenan Institute for Ethics, ‘The New Regulators? 
Assessing the Landscape of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives’ (June 2017),18 https://msi-




according to its analysis, RSPO is one of the very best performers. In terms of transparency, it is 
one of only 4 MSIs with complaints mechanisms which discloses information about the number 
and status of current and historic claims, publishes information about individual complaint 
decisions and conducts analysis of complaints received. 49  Our own analysis found that RSPO 
provides more details about complaint decisions than any other MSI. In terms of equitability, 
RSPO is one of only three MSIs that offers complainants both access to an advocate or other 
forms of assistance and a translation service.50 In terms of accessibility, RSPO is one of only 6 
MSIs which explicitly requires potential complainants to be given information about the 
complaint process, and one of only 12 that guarantees anonymity to the complainant.51 In terms 
of predictability, unlike most other MSIs, RSPO does specify expected timeframes for most 
stages of the complaints process.52 In terms of legitimacy, it is one of 20 MSI complaint 
mechanisms which has an explicit conflict of interest policy which states how it ensures that the 
decision-maker is free from any interest in the outcome.53  
Analysis undertaken of other types of NSBGMs reveals that the majority of companies’ 
operational level grievance mechanisms and development bank complaints mechanisms also 
                                                          
MSI Integrity, Not Fit-for-Purpose: The Grand Experiment of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives in Corporate 
Accountability, Human Rights and Global Governance (July 2020), 168 https://www.msi-integrity.org/not-fit-for-
purpose/#:~:text=Not%20Fit%2DFor%2DPurpose%20reflects,providing%20effective%20protection%20against%2
0abuse (accessed 20 July 2020).   
49 RSPO Trends Dataset, available from the MSI Integrity website (https://www.msi-integrity.org/) updated as of 30 
June 2019. MSI Integrity, Not-Fir-For Purpose, note 48, 178. For more details on the RSPO process see RSPO 
website, ‘Complaints System’, (no date), section 1.5. https://rspo.org/publications/download/bf72abc7fe14bae 
(accessed 19 March 2020). 
50 RSPO Trends Dataset, note 49.  
51 MSI Integrity, Not fit for purpose, note 48, 170 
52 Although, most notably for the overall timeframe of the case, an expected time period is not specified for the 
investigation period. Instead the complaints panel ‘shall stipulate a reasonable time within which its investigations 
or directions in relation to investigations are to be completed’ (RSPO website, Above n. 48, section 11.1)    




perform poorly when measured against the UNGP’s effectiveness criteria.54 Particularly in terms 
of accessibility, transparency, equitability and legitimacy, there are very few grievance 
mechanisms that are comparable to RSPO.55 Overall then, it is reasonable to conclude that RSPO 
performs well when compared to other NSBGMs according to the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria.     
IV. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
We sought to investigate the extent to which the RSPO complaints mechanism provides an 
effective substantive remedy in terms of the outcomes achieved for rightsholders. In so doing we 
relied upon the way in which effective substantive remedy is defined by the UN Guiding 
Principles and the way it is subsequently elaborated by the UN Working Group. The UN Guiding 
Principles defines effective substantive remedy as one which will “counteract or make good any 
human rights harms that have occurred.”56 This may be achieved through such remedies as 
“apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation and punitive 
sanctions (whether criminal or administrative, such as fines), as well as the prevention of harm 
through, for example, injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition.”57 In their July 2017 Report, 
the UN Working Group “unpacks the concept of access to effective remedies” under the UN 
Guiding Principles.58 The UN Working Group states that “merely providing access to remedial 
mechanisms will not suffice: there should be an effective remedy in practice at the end of the 
process.”59 It notes that the aim of remedy is “to place an aggrieved party in the same position as 
                                                          
54 Carla Garcia Zendejas, ‘Glass Half Full? The State of Accountability in Development Finance’, Centre for 
International Environmental Law, (2016) https://www.ciel.org/reports/glass-half-full-the-state-of-accountability-in-
development-finance-jan-2016/; (accessed 1 August 2020);  
55 The reports cited above analyse operational level grievance mechanisms and development bank complaints 
mechanisms respectively in relation to the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria. In relation to accessibility, transparency, 
equitability and legitimacy they find that levels of performance are generally significantly below that achieved by 
RSPO as identified above. In relation to predictability, the reports do not provide sufficient information to compare 
performance in a meaningful way.   
56 Human Rights Council, note 3, 22.  
57 Ibid.  
58 UN General Assembly, Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises  A/72/162) (18 July 2017). 




he or she would have been had no injury occurred.”60 The Report goes on to explain that 
effective remedy combines the related elements of prevention, redress and deterrence, and 
discusses restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, guarantees of non-repetition, as 
well as other remedies.61 The Report also asserts the centrality of rightsholders in determining 
whether an effective remedy has occurred and states that this requires that “the effectiveness of a 
remedy should be judged also from the perspective of affected rights holders.”62 
Synthesizing these pronouncements into a definition of effective remedy that can be utilized 
in our study we find an effective substantive remedy to occur when there is a: 
1. Cessation of the continuing violations of the human rights infringed, 
2. Restoration to the rightholder of full enjoyment of the rights, and/or adequate 
reparation for the harm suffered due to the lost enjoyment of those rights. 
In making a determination of whether these conditions are satisfied, our approach involves first 
inquiring as to whether the relevant authority (in our case the RSPO) itself considers that a 
remedy had been provided. Where this is the case, we then consider the outcomes of those cases 
from the rightsholders’ perspective to determine whether they consider their rights violations to 
be remedied. In so doing, we take seriously the Working Group’s requirement that the 
effectiveness of a remedy should be judged from the perspective of rightsholders. Our approach 
is then to compare the perspectives of rightsholders on whether the remedy is effective with the 
way it was presented by the relevant authority, and if there is a disparity, then the claim is placed 
in a special “discordant” category.63 As described below, this result did not occur with any of the 
RSPO claims, and so we do not have a discordant category in our data. Future studies will 
inevitably involve discordant scenarios where approaches will have to be devised for reaching a 
determination of whether an effective substantive remedy has in fact occurred.  
                                                          
60 Ibid, paragraph 39, quoting Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, p. 10. 
61 Ibid, paragraphs 40, 43-54.  
62 Ibid, paragraph 22.  
63 The rightsholders’ subjective perceptions are always relevant to understanding the reality of remedy. However, 




We are also cognizant of the fact that substantive outcomes could be fundamentally 
undermined by procedural aspects of the claims process. If procedural failings are sufficiently 
grave, this might lead to the conclusion that no substantive effective remedy has been, or could 
be achieved. Therefore, we also seek to ascertain if there are procedural aspects of the claim that 
might lead to the effective frustration of substantive outcomes. For instance this could be 
because of the length of time taken to achieve an effective remedy. We therefore seek evidence 
of such procedural issues in our examination of all materials in relation to the case produced by 
the relevant authority, and where such evidence exists, seek community perspectives to ascertain 
whether they perceive an effective remedy to be frustrated.    
 In operationalizing our approach into a methodology for conducting the study, there were 
two key stages. The first stage of our methodology was to review all the RSPO claims in which 
an order had been entered or a settlement reached. We did this by scrutinizing the claims files 
available on the RSPO claims website.64 Because the point of study is access to remedy for 
infringements of human rights, we reviewed the formal statement of claims in the claims file 
(including later amendments, if any) and determined if each claim raised a human rights issue.65 
Some claims solely involved topics clearly removed from human rights, these included issues 
such as orangutan habitat, individual contract terms or use of the RSPO certification in retail 
outlets. These claims were excluded from the study. Any claims that mixed human rights and 
non-human rights claims were included. There were also claims that were brought by RSPO 
itself in response to a public report, and in which no claimant ever came forward.66 As those 
claims had no individuals or groups requesting a remedy, they were excluded from this analysis. 
At this point we had identified a set of human rights claims in the RSPO complaint mechanism.  
                                                          
64 RSPO, Status of Complaints (no date) https://askrspo.force.com/Complaint/s/casetracker (accessed on 2 April 
2020). 
65 In accordance with the UNGPs, we used the International Bill of Rights and the Core Conventions of the 
International Labor Organization as the relevant set of internationally recognized set of rights.  
66 An example is RSPO Claim PreCAP/2015/24/PR Poligrow Italy (a subsidiary of Poligrow Colombia SAS) which 
was made in response to the Environmental Investigation Agency’s video ‘Between Water and Palm Oil’ (9 August 
2015) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6q2RU_8RRTc (accessed on 2 April 2020). While that group did have 
communications with RSPO regarding the claim, neither it nor any community or person ever filed a complaint in 




The human rights claims files were then reviewed to determine if a ruling was made by the 
RSPO complaints panel. The rulings are formal decision documents submitted by the complaints 
panel in each case in which a ruling was made. For claims in which no ruling was made, we 
determined if there was a recognition that a settlement was made between the parties leading to 
the case being closed. This was noted either by the complaints panel or on the RSPO website 
describing the claim. At this point we had a set of human rights claims which had been resolved, 
either by ruling of the complaints mechanisms or by settlement of the parties. We then placed 
each of these resolved claims into one of three groups: Group 1 (ruling made in favor of 
claimants), Group 2 (no ruling made in favor of claimant), and Group 3 (no ruling made, but case 
settled by mutual agreement of the parties). 
Group 3 (settled claims) was the most difficult group to analyze further. No Group 3 claim 
file included the terms of the settlement. This nondisclosure is not the decision of RSPO, but is 
the result of RSPO’s policy to respect confidentiality requests by a party.67 In other dispute 
resolution systems, such as court litigation or arbitration, it is common practice to make 
settlements confidential, particularly settlements of claims against companies. The company may 
consider it disadvantageous to appear to be publicly recognizing that a claim has merit. It may 
also wish to keep the details of what remedy has been agreed secret for fear lest it incentivizes 
others to make similar claims.68 It is reasonable to assume that rightsholders received some 
value, and gave up some value, to obtain these settlements, but to judge whether remedy was 
achieved would be speculation uninformed by facts. Once a claim was identified as being in 
Group 3, we did not investigate it any further. 
 The Group 2 claims were the ones in which the claimant did not prevail and was not 
awarded any remedy. These varied from a ruling by the complaints panel that the respondent 
company’s position was correct, to the claim being dismissed for lack of prosecution and 
responsiveness by the claimant, to the claim being withdrawn without explanation. Once a claim 
was identified as being in Group 2, we did not investigate it any further.  
                                                          
67 Comment from RSPO, 23 December 2019, by email.  
68 Providing various rationales for confidentiality in international arbitration processes, but also arguing that they are 
times overstated see Cindy Galway Buys ‘The tensions between confidentiality and transparency in international 




The Group 1 claims (ruling in favor of claimants) were the focus of our remaining research 
and analysis. These claims were further investigated to determine what remedy was actually 
received by the claimants according to the RSPO claim files. We noted what remedy was ordered 
by RSPO, but because our focus is on remedy, our goal was to determine what actually 
happened.  
In one important subset of Group 1 claims, in response to rulings against them, the 
respondent companies left RSPO, or the operation at issue was sold to a company that was not an 
RSPO member. In one case, the company was ordered by the Complaints Panel to leave RSPO. 
For these claims no remedy at all was actually received by the rightsholders, due to the company 
or operation intentionally leaving RSPO’s jurisdiction, or being ordered to do so. The RSPO 
system as a whole may well have been strengthened by removing these companies from RSPO 
certification, but that is an issue separate from that of remedy for rightholders. The rightsholders 
received nothing in these cases. We did further review of media reports, NGO and company 
statements and interviewed some claimants regarding these claims. The five claimants we spoke 
to were universally disappointed with the outcome of the process and frustrated that the RSPO 
claims mechanism was ineffectual in these cases.69   
For the remaining Group 1 claims, we contacted the person or entity acting as the 
representatives of the claimant in the RSPO complaint mechanism. Very rarely, this was the 
rightsholders themselves, but was almost always a local or international NGO or labor union.70 
As discussed in more detail below, there were four such Group I claims. We interviewed ten 
individuals who worked for NGOs that brought the four claims. 71   The goal of these interviews 
was to get the perspective of the claimants on their use of the RSPO complaint mechanism 
                                                          
69 Interview of international NGO, 27 August 2019. Interview of local NGO, 24 June 2019. Interview of 
International NGO, 27 September 2019. Email exchange with International NGO 1, 19 August 2019. Interview with 
International NGO 23 July 2019.   
70 The only cases in which  rightsholders were interviewed directly to obtain this information was in the claim 
Sustainable Development Institute v. Equatorial Palm Oil (a subsidiary of Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad), 
described in detail below, and in the claim Zebilon Siligen v. New Britain Palm Oil, filed 15 August 2015: 
https://askrspo.force.com/Complaint/s/case/50090000028Es0xAAC/ (accessed 3 August 2020). 
71 Six of the interviews were conducted by phone. Four of the interviewees were interviewed both on the phone and 




generally and to confirm the facts as presented in the RSPO claim files. In particular, we wanted 
to confirm that the orders made by RSPO had been carried out in reality and in what way the 
claimants had received a remedy for the violation of their human rights. Questions were 
therefore asked which were intended to elicit evidence of objective facts, such as whether 
community land was still being used by a company as part of a palm oil plantation, or whether 
community members were still incarcerated for anti-company protests.  
When, as discussed in more detail below, the claimants representatives did, in fact, assert that 
there had been some form of effective and meaningful remedy for their human rights violations, 
we visited the affected rightsholders in person to verify the validity of their assertion, witness the 
situation on the ground and interview multiple rightsholders and people knowledgeable about the 
situation. We did this because representative organizations often have their own objectives and 
perspectives that may be distinct from those of the rightsholders they represent. As explained 
below, there was only one case in which it was necessary to visit the rightholders themselves and 
witness the remedy that had been received. This claim was examined in detail. The area and 
community were visited four times over four years. This was a land claim and the land itself was 
visited to confirm that it had not been incorporated into the palm oil plantation. We interviewed 
farmers working the land, community leaders, people who lived next to the land and company 
representative about the status and use of the land. In addition, we conducted semi-structured 
interviews with leaders among the claimant group, various individual community members, a 
lengthy public town hall meeting with the claimant community, an in-depth focus group with 
representative community members, and private interviews with multiple individual claimants. 
In all, eighty-nine rightsholders participated in the focus group or group discussions we 
organized and ran. In addition, twenty-four of the participants in these groups were also 
interviewed individually.   
Alongside our interrogation of the substantive outcomes in cases, we also inquired about the 
claimants’ perceptions of going through every step of the claims process, and the time and effort 
involved (i.e. their perception of the procedural aspects of the process) to understand if they 
perceived these as frustrating their efforts to obtain a substantive outcome. In doing so, we also 
sought to uncover new information that we did not know, but was relevant to understanding of 




rightsholder interviews revealed that one respondent company that lost an RSPO claim, provided 
an effective remedy, and then retaliated against some of the claimant group. This was new 
information that was not part of the RSPO claim or included in the claims file.  
There were 58 RSPO resolved claims when we finished our review in February 2020.72 Of 
those, three were merged into other claims or otherwise were not considered meaningful as 
separate claims. This left 55 claims in which there had been a ruling or settlement. Of those, 39 
were determined to be human rights claims at least in part. These claims fell into four general 
categories: land, labor, pollution and violence. Thirty of the claims included significant land 
issues. Often the issue was whether the land cleared, planted and incorporated into the plantation 
was actually owned or legally controlled by the company. Land title may have been in question 
or the legal right of the company to public “forest” land was disputed. Another common claim 
was under the RPSO requirement that a plantation could only be established with the free prior 
and informed consent (“FPIC”) of the local community with customary or user rights to the land 
(Community FPIC).73 This RSPO standard includes the principle of free prior and informed 
consent of indigenous peoples as recognized by the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and ILO Convention 169. Indeed, some RSPO claims are by indigenous groups. But the 
RSPO FPIC standard also encompasses local communities, whether or not they are indigenous. 
This greatly expands the applicability of FPIC. The pollution claims were usually made in 
addition to other claims and generally concerned mill waste contaminating surface water. The 
labor claims generally concerned conditions of work, payment and worker safety. The rare 
                                                          
72 Of course, new events have occurred in these cases after we finished our review and before publication. One 
particularly notable claim which had been open and “under investigation” for eight years, was the subject of a 
OECD Swiss National Contact Point specific instance against RSPO itself. It is reported to have resulted in a 
settlement. (OECD, Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil and TUK Indonesia: Land Conflict in Indonesia (no date) 
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/database/instances/ch0017.htm (accessed on 20 November 2020), although the RSPO 
claim is not yet closed as of November 2020. ( PT Mitra Austral Sejahtera (a subsidiary of Sime Darby Plantation 
Berhad v The communities of Sanggau (Kerunang & Entapang), Transparansi untuk Keadilan (TuK) (no date)  
 https://askrspo.force.com/Complaint/s/case/50090000028ErzsAAC/detail (accessed 20 Novemner 2020).  
73 RSPO website, ‘Principles and Criteria for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil’ (2018) 
https://rspo.org/resources/certification/rspo-principles-criteria-certification (accessed 2 April 2020), 35, Criteria 4.4: 
‘Use of the land for oil palm does not diminish the legal, customary or user rights of other users without their Free, 




violence claims alleged excessive force used by plantation private security personnel or by 
public security at the behest of the company.   
 
V. OUTCOMES OF CASES 
In this section, we analyse the substantive outcomes of cases. Utilising the categorization of 
claims we developed in the previous section, we found the following results; Group 1 (claims in 
which there was a ruling in favor of the claimant) contained 10 claims. Group 2 (claims in which 
there was not ruling in favor of the claimant) contained 18 claims. Group 3 (claims in which the 
parties agreed to settle) contained 11 claims. It is the Group 1 claims, and the extent to which 
they provided an effective remedy to the claimants that we analyse below. One immediate 
observation about the numbers of Group 1 claims is how frequently the RSPO member company 
was found to be in the wrong. In 10 of the 28 cases that were not resolved by settlement, there 
was a clear ruling by the RSPO complaints panel against the company. Those decisions were 
made publicly and can be used by the NGO claimants in all their diverse efforts (media 
coverage, protests, court cases, etc.) to obtain their ends.74 However, this benefit to the NGO 
claimants does not mean that the rightsholder themselves achieved an effective remedy.    
Of the ten Group 1 claims, in six cases the respondent company left RSPO (Group 1C in the 
table below). In none of those cases did the claimant obtain a remedy for human rights 
violations. Of the remaining four claims in Group I, in three of the cases the remedy has not yet 
been substantially achieved (Group 1B). In one case, the rightholders prevailed, the remedy was 
                                                          
74 For example, in a case in Peru, the RSPO ruling was used in a land proceeding before the Constitutional Court and 
to support a requested criminal investigation. Interview of international NGO, 27 August 2019 by 
telecommunication; In person interview of local NGO, 28 November 2019, Geneva, Switzerland. The Liberian 
NGOs used the RSPO rulings extensively in their media presence. See, e.g. Carolyn Ziv, ‘Power of the People: How 
a Liberian Clan Took on an International Palm Oil Company—and won’ American Jewish World Service (22 
August, 2016) https://ajws.org/blog/power-people-liberian-clan-took-international-palm-oil-company-won/ 





ordered, it was carried out and the rightsholders did, in fact, obtain a remedy (Group 1A).  These 
cases and groups are discussed in more detail below.  
INSERT Table 1 Group Claims (see end of manuscript) 
For the cases in Group 1C, the pattern is rather consistent. There was a clear ruling against 
the company. The company protested and sometimes appealed the ruling. Monitoring continued 
and found non-compliance. Threating communications came from the Complaints Panel. 
Ultimately the company quit RSPO (three cases) or sold the plantation at issue to a company that 
was not an RSPO member (two cases). The company then, logically, argued RSPO had no 
jurisdiction and ignored the ruling. In the one remaining case, the Complaints Panel suspended 
the membership status of the company, only allowing it to return once it could prove compliance. 
There is no record that it attempted to do so. In none of these cases did the claimants receive any 
benefit, other than, perhaps, the satisfaction of seeing the respondent company leaving RSPO. 
Applying the definition of effective remedy stated above, there was no cessation, restoration, or 
reparation of any kind. The company or plantation at issue simply exited the certification scheme 
and the grounds of complaint persisted unremedied. These companies lost the ability to obtain 
RSPO certification for their products. Such a certification is generally considered a financial 
benefit, and so these companies did voluntarily forego that benefit. But no remedy was provided 
to rightsholders for the human rights infringements which RSPO found to exist in these cases. 
Far from an effective remedy, these actions must be deemed “effective evasion.”   
The Group 1B claims are those in which a remedy was ordered, but has not yet been 
provided. For the three Group 1B claims we provide summaries of key aspects of the case so that 
the rationale for why no remedy has been yet provided is clear. 
Alman, S.H. gampo Alam, Pucuak Adat Nagari Kapa (indigenous leader of the Nagari Kapa) 
supported by the Forest People Programme et al. vs. PT Permata Hijau Pasaman (a subsidiary of 
Wilmar International Limited).75 The Nagari Kapa indigenous community of Sumatra, Indonesia, 
accused the respondent company, a subsidiary of the world’s largest palm oil producer, of 
incorporating their land, without their consent, into its plantation over twenty years ago. The 
                                                          





RSPO claim commenced in 2014 and eventually included allegations that the claimants had been 
charged, arrested and pressured by police to drop the RSPO claim. These criminalization claims 
have not been ruled on by the RSPO. On the land issues, the RSPO Complaint Panel ruled in 
favor of the community and ordered the company to cooperate in formally turning over land 
rights to the community through a government land agency and to reach agreement with the 
community regarding a full remedy. The respondent company appealed the ruling, then withdrew 
the appeal in 2017. The company was ordered to, and did, submit a Letter of Non-Reprisal 
promising not to “employ any act of harassment or intimidation” to the claimants.76 More than 
two years after the withdrawal of the appeal, RSPO has facilitated meetings between the parties 
but no agreement has been reached, and there is no evidence that progress has been made in 
reaching an agreed conclusive remedy.77 The company is still in possession of the disputed land.  
Green Advocates on behalf of communities in Greenville, Butaw and Kpanyan et al. vs. Golden 
Veroleum (Liberia) (a subsidiary of Golden Agri Resources Ltd.).78 This is a particularly 
complex case involving many communities in central Liberia against a subsidiary of the world’s 
fifth largest palm oil producer. The claim was filed in 2012 and involved multiple issues 
including the company’s failure to obtain community consent to expand onto its land. RSPO 
ruled in 2016 that community consent had not been obtained. The company appealed, and when 
it lost the appeal in 2018, publicly announced that it was leaving RSPO.  Two years later, it is 
still listed as a member and is actively engaging with the RSPO Complaint Panel on the claim.  
The company states that it stopped all clearing of new land since the RSPO ruling, although it 
                                                          
76 Letter from Perpetua George, General Manager, Group Sustainability, Wilmar International Limited (30 
November 2017). 
https://ap8.salesforce.com/sfc/p/#90000000YoJi/a/90000000PXdi/a.y_0q50Q00Lhdyqlm89nZD88NZjbnaQUL96J
QYWV4Y (accessed 2 April 2020). 
77 RSPO claims file, note 76; Interview of international NGO, 2 August 2019, by written communication.  
78 RSPO Reference No. PreCAP/2012/09/PR, https://askrspo.force.com/Complaint/s/case/50090000028ErzuAAC/ 
(accessed 2 April 2020). It was consolidated with other RSPO claims regarding GVL’s actions in Liberia. Alfred 
Brownell of Green Advocates was awarded the 2019 Goldman Environmental Prize (the “world’s foremost award 
honoring grassroots environmental activists”) for his work on this case. See the Goldman Environmental Prize, 
Alfred Brownell 2019 Goldman Prize Recipient, Africa (no date) https://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/alfred-




completed work, including planting and construction of a mill, on land that had been cleared 
prior to ruling.79  The communities claim that the mill occupies a sacred site.80 There have been 
violent protests involving these parties in the past and at present the affected communities are 
uncertain and frustrated as to how the land acquisition will be addressed and resolved.81 The 
company has put in a new community relations team since the RSPO ruling and states that it is 
committed to RSPO standards and community respect.82 The ultimate resolution of these issues 
is uncertain.  
Environmental Investigation Agency (“EIA”), Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN) and 
the community of Muara Tae vs. PT Borneo Surya Mining Jaya (a subsidiary of First Resources 
Limited).83 This claim was filed in 2012 and alleges that First Resources, a multi-billion dollar 
palm oil corporation based in Singapore, had failed to get the free, prior and informed consent 
(“FPIC”) of a local community to include their land in its plantation. The Muara Tae is a 
traditional community in Kalimantan, the portion of the island of Borneo that is part of 
Indonesia. The RSPO Complaints Panel ordered the company to stop all expansion while the 
claim was being resolved. RSPO did an investigation that found multiple violations of RSPO 
principles, and validated the claim made by the Muara Tae regarding its land. RSPO ordered the 
company to obtain the Muara Tae’s FPIC. However, the boundaries of the community land 
needed to be agreed upon, and, until they were, the RSPO ordered the company not to expand its 
plantation onto 892 hectares of what it believed to be part of the approximately 4300 hectares of 
claimed community land. RSPO brought in a third-party facilitator to get the parties to agree on 
multiple unresolved issues. The Muara Tae strongly objected to the facilitator and relations broke 
down. The community refused to participate in the joint mapping of the disputed land and 
                                                          
79 RSPO claims file, note 79; Interview of company management, February 14, 2020, Monrovia, Liberia.  
80 RSPO claims file, note 79; Interview of national NGO, 6 February 2020, Monrovia, Liberia.  
81 The violent protests were well documented in the press as well as personal interview with UN Peacekeeper 
Representative, 12 April 2016, near Greenville, Liberia. For the community frustration, Interview of national NGO, 
6 February 2020, Monrovia, Liberia, Interview of addition national NGO, 7 February 2020, Monrovia, Liberia.  
82 Interview of company management personnel, 14 February 2020, Monrovia, Liberia. Interview of national NGO, 
6 February 2020, Monrovia, Liberia.  





withdrew from the case.84 EIA, an international NGO who was a claimant in the case, stated that 
“the decision of the community of Muara Tae to withdraw from the RSPO dispute resolution 
process . . .  was the result of the failure of the RSPO dispute resolution process to provide the 
community with sufficient input into its design and conduct.”85 In 2015, the RSPO admitted that 
“the Complaints Panel cannot be effective in the absence of a genuine will by the parties to 
cooperate and work together towards mutually beneficial solutions.”86 The case was closed as 
“unresolved” in 2018. EIA states that while the 892 hectares identified in the order have not been 
further developed by First Resources, “the land conflict continues.”87 
 Applying our definition of effective remedy to the Group IB claims, the essential 
elements of cessation, restoration and/or reparation are clearly still absent. Moving on to the sole 
Group1A claim, where a remedy was provided, the key issues in relation to the case and the 
remedy provided were as follows:  
Sustainable Development Institute v. Equatorial Palm Oil (a subsidiary of Kuala Lumpur 
Kepong Berhad).88 This case was brought in 2013 by a local NGO on behalf of the Jogbahn Clan 
of the Bassa tribe in Liberia against a subsidiary of the world’s third largest palm oil producer. It 
challenged a plantation’s threatened expansion onto community land without its consent. The 
company claimed that it had a right to expand under its Concession Agreement with the 
Government of Liberia. It had obtained and occupied thousands of hectares up to the very 
boundary of the community land. It had the power and stated intention of incorporating that land 
into the plantation, and that incorporation appeared imminent when the claim was brought. The 
                                                          
84 RSPO claims file, note 84. 
85 Letter from Tom Johnson, Forest Campaigner, Environmental Investigation Agency (16 February 2015) 
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87 Environmental Investigation Agency ‘Who Watches the Watchman II’ (November 2019) https://eia-
international.org/wp-content/uploads/WWtW2-spreads.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2020), 15. 





power dynamics were such that all of the land claimed by the company for this plantation had 
been occupied and planted and no opposition by any community or individual landowner had 
been successful. The fear of imminent expropriation of this land was so great in 2013 that 
members of the Jogbahn Clan marched protesting it, and were, reportedly, violently arrested by 
the local police at the company’s request. They were quickly released by a magistrate with no 
charges, but the police attack on the protest remains a traumatic event in the eyes of the 
community.89Neither the Jogbahn Clan member nor the NGO representing them had faith in the 
court system to protect them. The NGO representative called the court system “hopeless” and 
one Clan member in a public meeting said flatly “RSPO is more caring than the government.” 
This last statement was echoed by loud agreement from the others present. A complaint was filed 
in October 2013 with the RSPO complaints mechanism, which was investigated and upheld. In 
response to the Complaint Panel’s ruling, the company stopped the expansion at the very border 
of the community’s land. It held a joint mapping exercise to determine the exact boundary of the 
claimed community land and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) promising not to 
enter the land without the community’s free, prior and informed consent.90 One of the Jogbahn 
elders stated during a public “town hall” style meeting that the NGOs representing them in the 
RSPO claim “taught us the word ‘FPIC’.”  
Since the MOU was signed and the case was closed in 2016, the community has repeatedly 
complained that the company is trying to inappropriately circumvent the MOU by approaching 
individuals who are not authorized community representatives to undermine and attempt to 
                                                          
89 Carolyn Ziv, ‘Power of the People: How a Liberian Clan took on an International Palm Oil Company—and won’, 
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members, the NGOs involved in the claim and company personnel regarding the formal resolution of the claim and 




reverse it.91 They also claim that all members of the claimant group working on the plantation 
were terminated and told they could not return to work there until the land is handed over to the 
company.92 There continues to be hostility over this land and the company’s efforts to obtain it, 
but, to date, the land remains in community hands and no new claims have been made to the 
RSPO regarding these perceived attempts to retaliate and undo the remedy delivered by the first 
claim. Due to a change in business plans, the company states that it is not currently attempting to 
obtain the community land.93 When seventy members of the Jogbahn Clan were asked at a public 
meeting if they would someday convey the land to EPO, they responded, loudly, in one voice 
“Never!” 
Applying the definition of effective remedy to this case, it is clear that the primary 
substantive issue was ownership and use of a defined parcel of land. The company sought to take 
possession of the land, but the RSPO ruling led to a cessation of these efforts. This was, in one 
sense, a situation where the human rights violation was yet to happen. However, the conflicting 
claims by the company and community to the land presented a real ongoing human rights 
infringement. For example, why plant crops or a rubber tree that produces for decades on land 
the company was about to occupy? Also, the Jogbahn Clan claimed this land as part of its 
traditional heritage and to give it no say in, much less compensation for, the land’s expropriation 
was an injury to their traditional property rights and to their own identity and dignity. The RSPO 
ruling effectively gave the Jogbahn Clan their say and they said “no.” The company respected 
that decision at least to the extent of not actually occupying the land and assuring all that it 
would not occupy it without the community’s prior consent.  
RSPO did provide an effective remedy here to the claim submitted to it. The claimants 
are today using their land for their own benefit. The unbroken blanket of plantation palm oil trees 
go right up to the land’s western border. While are there are potentially new claims that the 
                                                          
91 Multiple interviews with community members, 9 May 2019, and 4 February 2020 near the Palm Bay Estate, 
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company has acted in bad faith attempting to change the community’s position on the land, those 
claims have not been submitted to RSPO.  
 Overall then, only one of the ten cases that produced a ruling in favor of the claimant led 
to a remedy being provided to the community, albeit with the community claiming that the 
company has taken action to undermine that result. We have focused on the outcomes of cases 
because we argue that these present the most important evidence of how the system is 
functioning from the complainant’s perspective. We are not thereby claiming that the process 
which produces these outcomes does not matter. In our interviews, there was some praise from 
claimants for aspects of the RSPO claim process. Its ease of filing and accessibility were noted.94 
In some cases, the RSPO investigation method was considered accurate and reliable.95 The 
overall competence of the RSPO complaint panels was recognized.96 Most of these commenters 
emphasized that, although flawed, the RSPO complaint mechanism provided a tool that did not 
otherwise exist.97  
At the same time, the most common criticism was the length of time it takes for a claim to be 
determined.98 Even in the one case in which a remedy was ordered and actually received by the 
claimants (the Group IA case, Equatorial Palm Oil in Liberia), the claimants’ one criticism of the 
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2019, by telecommunication. 
97 Interview of international NGO 24 June 2019. Interview of International NGO 27 August 2019 by 
telecommunication. Interview of national NGO, 2 May 2019, outside of Monrovia, Liberia. Interview of national 
NGO, 5 February 2020, Monrovia, Liberia.  
98 Interview of national NGO, 2 May 2019, outside of Monrovia, Liberia. Interview of national NGO, 5 February 
2020, Monrovia, Liberia. Multiple interviews with community members, 9 May 2019, and 4 February 2020 near the 
Palm Bay Estate, Grand Bassa County Liberia. Interview of international NGO 24 June 2019. Interview of local 





RSPO process was the amount of time it took.99 An analysis of all of the human rights 
complaints brought through the RSPO complaints mechanism, considering the time between the 
submission of the claim to the time when the case was formally closed by RSPO, shows that 
cases varied greatly in duration. Analyzing in terms of the groups identified above, we find the 
following results:  
INSERT Table 2 Duration of Claims (see end of manuscript) 
As is typical of most adjudicative systems, the duration range is broad. Some cases are 
withdrawn, dismissed or settled quickly. Others take a full process of investigation, decision, 
monitoring, further decision, and appeal. The RSPO process is not quick. An average human 
rights claim takes two years to conclude.  The average for a “winning” claim (Group 1) is almost 
three years. Group 1B claims are currently averaging four and half years, but because the remedy 
has not yet been provided in those cases, the final time periods will be even longer. One large, 
complex case (Golden Veroleum (Liberia)) is already at over seven years and there is no end in 
sight. This raises broader issues about the appropriate methods by which to gauge issues relating 
to the timeliness of cases, which we return to consider in the following section.     
   
VI.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE STUDY OF WHETHER NSBGMS PROVIDE 
EFFECTIVE REMEDY  
Our findings about the RSPO complaints mechanism bring new evidence to debates about 
the way in which we should assess whether NSBGMs are providing an effective remedy. Below 
we reflect on the key findings of our study, how they resonate with the existing literature which 
studies the effectiveness of NSBGMs, and what the implications of our findings are for how we 
study whether NSBGMs are providing an effective remedy in the future.  
Measured in terms of the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria, we have demonstrated how RSPO is 
a complaint mechanism which has many of the characteristics that should make a grievance 
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mechanism successful in terms of providing effective remedies to claimants. It is more 
demonstrably transparent, accessible and equitable than the vast majority of other NSBGMs. It 
also performs comparatively well in terms of legitimacy and predictability. But our analysis of 
the substantive remedies achieved for rightsholders in practice confirms concerns raised in the 
literature that focusing on the process of how an NSBGM operates may marginalise the more 
fundamental question of what outcomes are actually achieved for rightsholders. 100  Only one 
case in the ten-year history of the mechanism is a clear adjudicative win providing a remedy for 
rightsholders, and that came after a long, time-consuming fight on an issue that appeared to be 
clear cut in the claimants’ favor.  Even after the victory, with community land still untouched by 
the planation, there are serious allegations that the company has used unfair pressure tactics to 
undo the result. Our case study therefore provides evidence to support the claim that an NSBGM 
which meets the standards of procedural fairness demanded by the UNGPs effectiveness criteria 
might still fail to provide an effective remedy for claimants.101 The corollary of this is that future 
studies of the effectiveness of NSBGSMs must focus at least as much on outcomes as on 
processes. But there are also a number of more nuanced ways in which our findings speak to the 
way such studies should be conducted.  
First, our study speaks to the importance of investigating carefully how and why outcomes 
occurred as they did. In our case study, there were a significant number of cases in which RSPO 
ruled against its member companies. This would indicate a process which can validate legitimate 
claims. However, the action that followed on from a successful claim was inherently limited, and 
undoubtedly could not be considered to be capable of providing effective remedy in terms of 
providing appropriate outcomes to all claimants. Complaints panels cannot, for instance, award 
monetary compensation or provide any form of restitution. The range of elements identified by 
the UN Working Group as integral to the provision of effective remedy are certainly not 
therefore available the RSPO process.102 Still, in a number of cases, RSPO complaints panels 
ordered remedies which could have materially affected the lives of the people who brought the 
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claims. It is its record on enforcing those remedies in order to produce meaningful outcomes for 
claimants which is arguably its biggest weakness. 
In those claims where there was an order in favour of the claimant, the most common reason 
for non-enforcement was because the company was no longer an RSPO member. In five of these 
cases the company quit RSPO or sold the plantation at issue to a non-member company. In the 
other case, the Complaints Panel withdrew the membership status of the company. This result 
may be considered effective in terms of safeguarding the legitimacy of RSPO’s certification 
process. But it does not provide any remedy, much less an effective remedy, to rightsholders that 
addresses their human rights issues. These situations demonstrate the limitations of a voluntary 
system where terminating membership is a genuine alternative to providing a remedy to 
rightsholders. The prevalence of these claims is significant. These are not rare cases or outliers, 
but a category which demonstrates a proven technique useful and effective for companies 
violating human rights; Leave the certification scheme and avoid having to provide a remedy. 
This is a clear limitation on any voluntary scheme in acting as an NSBGM: if a member 
company’s cost of departing the scheme is less than the cost of addressing a complaint, there are 
significant and proven dangers that many will leave the scheme. This is a problem which any 
voluntary scheme must solve in order become a genuine human rights NSBGM. It is also 
confirmation of the need to scrutinize carefully the power dynamics of any individual NSBGM 
in order to determine its capacity to achieve effective remedy.103   
In the other cases where orders were made in favour of the claimants, a remedy has not yet 
been provided. There are two claims still in process that could end as wins for the claimants. 
However, they have already taken years of effort, and an ultimate resolution that remedies 
human rights infringements is uncertain at best, hopeless at worst. They may well already be in 
the category of “justice delayed and so denied.” These cases are indicative of a process that is 
often very tardy in producing results, where claimants must be prepared to face a process lasting 
years. One of the stated advantages of NSBGMs is that they should provide more expeditious 
processes than litigation through the courts.104 In the case of the RSPO’s complaints mechanism, 
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it is not at all clear that this is the case. Our findings also cast doubt on the way in which the 
UNGPs effectiveness criteria measure procedural effectiveness. On the issue of timeliness, the 
criteria require that claimants are provided with “a clear and known procedure with an indicative 
time frame for each stage.”105  But our analysis of the duration of RSPO claims, combined with 
interviews with rightsholders revealed that it is more vital is to measure the actual time taken for 
claimants to obtain the remedy they are seeking. This reaffirms the UN Working Group’s 
assertion that it is crucial that the effectiveness of a remedy should be judged from the 
perspective of affected rights holders,106 and raises questions about the degree to which the 
UNGPs effectiveness criteria measure those procedural aspects of the claims process that are 
most important to those rightsholders. Future studies may therefore benefit from making 
stakeholder concerns more central to measuring the procedural aspects of NSBGMs.     
  A final observation raises an important question about the feasibility of conducting 
future studies. In terms of outcomes for claimants, perhaps the most satisfactory results were 
achieved in those six claims that resulted in an agreed settlement (Group 1C). It can justifiably 
be presumed that the claimants received some benefit there. It is also likely that those claimants 
gave up something to arrive at the final agreement.  Unfortunately, there is no transparency in 
these settled cases and so it is not known what their real benefit was to rightsholders. 
Confidentiality is often a prerequisite to a corporation’s willingness to compromise a serious 
claim, particularly one potentially affecting the company’s reputation. Requiring transparency 
could chill the settlement process and would almost certainly reduce the number of settled cases. 
Balancing these interests is a challenge for all NSBGMs. As other studies have found, 
complaints mechanisms in many other MSIs are far less transparent, and do not publish results of 
any cases.107  Companies’ operational level grievance mechanisms also rarely if ever publicize 
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the results of any complaints which they address.108 The problems of lack of transparency 
identified here are therefore greatly exacerbated across other NSBGMs and will mitigate against 
the kind of study we have undertaken here for many other (although not all) NSBGMs in the 
future. This is an issue we return to consider in the conclusion. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Our case study has raised serious question about the capacity of the RSPO complaint 
mechanism to provide effective access to remedy for human rights violations. Even as a 
compliment to judicial and other forms of remedy, its value appears very limited. With dozens of 
cases over more than ten years, effective remedy was ordered and achieved exactly once. It 
cannot therefore be relied upon to produce timely outcomes in decided cases that lead to 
effective remedies. It fares even worse when considered as a replacement for other forms of 
remedy. Beyond its lack of capacity to enforce judgments, the aims of the system can actually be 
at odds with the goal of providing effective remedy for rightsholders, particularly where it 
withdraws membership from the company, leaving rightsholders without a means of obtaining 
remedy.  
The ramifications of these findings stretch far beyond this single case. Building on previous 
studies which have raised generalized concerns about using the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria as 
the basis for determining whether NSBGMs are actually effective in practice, our detailed 
investigation of a single NSBGM provides clear evidence of the need to develop alternative 
frameworks of assessment. Since the RSPO complaints mechanism performs well when 
compared to other NSBGMs in relation to the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria, but performs 
poorly when evaluating actual outcomes for complainants, this raises serious questions about the 
UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria as a measure of effective remedy.109 They appear insufficient to 
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distinguish between NSBGMs that are actually producing effective remedies for rightsholders 
and those that are not. However, they remain the primary point of engagement for NSBGMs 
when thinking about issues relating to effective remedy. RSPO is one of many NSBGMs which 
has sought to strengthen its complaints mechanism with reference to the UNGPs’ effectiveness 
criteria. While the UNGPs and the UN Working Group both stress the importance of outcomes in 
determining effective remedies they have not yet operationalized this in a way that has 
significantly influenced the practice of evaluating and reforming NSBGMs. 
Future studies of other NSBGMs should therefore carefully examine outcomes for 
complainants, alongside revised procedural criteria which prioritise issues of greatest importance 
to rightsholders, such as the length of time cases actually take in practice. We have provided an 
approach and methodology that can be utilized in other studies, although we recognize that study 
of other NSBGMs will require addressing new methodological issues that have not been an issue 
in our case, such as how to deal with cases where the perspectives of rightsholders on whether 
the remedy was effective differed from the way in which it was presented by the relevant 
authority. A more significant impediment to such future study is the absence of levels of 
transparency in the majority of NSBGMs which made our study possible. It is reasonable to 
expect the most transparent mechanisms to be the ones that perform best for rightsholders in 
practice. Their proponents have put them on show because they are sufficiently confident to open 
them up to scrutiny. The failings of RSPO should therefore increase skepticism about NSBGMs 
which are not transparent.  Claims about providing an ‘effective remedy’ should only be treated 
seriously if mechanisms provide sufficient information to allow for serious scrutiny of outcomes.  
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